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CONANT V WALTERS: A MISAPPLICATION OF
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS IN THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION
In Conant v. Walters,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
addressed the application of the First Amendment's right of free speech 2 to a fed-
eral policy that prohibited the recommendation of medical marijuana by physi-
cians. 3 This class action suit, brought by physicians and severely ill patients, 4
successfully enjoined the federal government from enforcing its policy revoking
the federal prescriptive licenses of physicians who recommend or approve of mari-
juana use by patients suffering from certain severe illnesses.5 The federal
government's policy, issued in 1996 through a statement of Barry McCaffrey, di-
rector of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),6 responded di-
rectly to recent legislation in California decriminalizing the use of marijuana un-
der certain medically-approved circumstances. 7 The California legislation also
protected physicians from prosecution under state law for recommending mari-
juana use. 8 Entering an injunction against the federal policy, the United States
District Court held that, although the federal government had the right to regulate
the distribution and use of marijuana, it could not interfere with First Amendment
interests by precluding doctors and patients from discussing marijuana as a treat-
ment for medical conditions. 9 On appeal, the majority affirmed on the basis of the
First Amendment implications of the government policy. 10 The concurring opin-
ion, however, expressed another reason for enjoining the government from enforc-
ing its policy, specifically the Commandeering Doctrine, which prohibits the fed-
eral government from requiring that states address a particular problem or enforce
a federal regulatory program.11 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October
14, 2003.12
1. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech . U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
3. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
4. The plaintiffs in this case included patients with serious illnesses, their treating physicians
(all licensed in the State of California), a patient's organization (Being Alive: People with HIV/
AIDS Action Coalition, Inc.), and a physician's organization (Bay Area Physicians for Human
Rights). Id. at 633.
5. Id, at 632.
6. The policy, entitled "Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215," was a product of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and was pub-
lished as a notice in the Federal Register on February 11, 1997. Administration Response to
Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
7. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d at 632. See The Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH
& SAFEY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2004).
8. Conant v. Waiters, 309 F.3d at 632.
9. Id. at 633-34.
10. Id. at 639.
11. Id. at 645.
12. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 387 (2003).
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Although the Ninth Circuit appropriately recognized that the First Amend-
ment extends to the doctor-patient relationship, the majority failed to articulate the
full nature of the speech rights implicated by the policy and the basis of the federal
policy enacted to regulate physician recommendations of marijuana use. The
majority's use of free speech rights in this case is simply disguised policy-making,
evidenced by an insufficient analysis of First Amendment rights as they pertain to
physician recommended-use of substances illegal under federal law. The Ninth
Circuit, viewing the medical use of marijuana as appropriate in some circumstances,
made a policy choice to allow physicians to make medical recommendations on
the matter, or at least to prohibit the government from stopping them. This policy
choice is made even more evident in view of the fact that the Supreme Court re-
cently reversed a Ninth Circuit decision concerning the exemption of federal drug
laws in circumstances where marijuana is dispensed for medical purposes. 13 Hav-
ing failed to exempt federal drug laws in cases of medical necessity, the Court of
Appeals, in Conant v. Walters, used the First Amendment to further its agenda of
keeping the federal government out of the realm of medical marijuana.
Although the concurring opinion recognized the tensions between state and
federal policies regarding physician recommendations of marijuana, the concur-
rence also failed to provide a full analysis of the issues presented in the case. Based
on the Commandeering Doctrine, the concurring opinion argued that because fed-
eral drug laws rely heavily on local law enforcement, particularly in circumstances
involving possession of small amounts, as is generally the case for patients using
marijuana for medical purposes, the policy against doctor recommendations repre-
sented a federal effort to force the State of California to change its law on the
medical use of marijuana. The concurring opinion, however, failed to fully ex-
plain how the federal government would rely on the State to enforce its policy, 14
and ultimately fell short of a complete legal analysis of the issue. The Ninth Circuit's
poorly drafted response to the federal government's puzzling policy resulted in
increased ambiguity regarding the scope of the First Amendment in physician-
patient relationships and the authority of the federal government to regulate pro-
fessional conduct.
This Note explores federal laws that pertain to marijuana use, as well as
California's policies on medical marijuana and physician recommendations, con-
sidering the implications of both the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause
in the resolution of this case. This Note concludes that the Ninth Circuit compli-
cated the issue by failing to address the legal effect of the statement issued by the
ONDCP. This Note ultimately concludes that the Ninth Circuit erred by finding a
federal policy it considered "bad policy" to be unconstitutional on free speech
grounds, and further explores the possible invalidation of the policy for exceeding
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.
13. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001), rev'g United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999).
14. After all, the policy itself calls for action by the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices and the Department of Justice, both agencies of the federal government. Conant v. Walters,
309 F.3d at 633.
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I. POLICIES ON MARIUANA USE, DISTRIBUTION,
AND MEDICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Federal Policies
Marijuana has been used for medicinal purposes in the United States since the
early 1800s. 15 In fact, marijuana use was unregulated by the United States gov-
ernment until 1937, when the Congress first imposed the Marihuana Tax Act to
curb increasing recreational use of the drug. 16 The Marihuana Tax Act required
recreational users of marijuana to pay a fee of $100 an ounce, while medical users
were required to pay only one dollar per ounce. 17 The Marihuana Tax Act re-
mained the country's sole regulation on marijuana use and distribution until 1970,
when Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, which classified all illegal
drugs, placing marijuana under Schedule 1, the most restrictive category. 18 Under
the Controlled Substances Act, physicians are not allowed to prescribe Schedule 1
drugs, including marijuana. In pertinent part, the Controlled Substances Act pro-
vides that marijuana is illegal to "manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense." 19 The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the federal agency primarily responsible for the enforce-
ment of drug laws, has advocated in favor of the Controlled Substances Act's poli-
cies against marijuana use, maintaining that it is not an appropriate drug for medi-
cal use.20
The Controlled Substances Act has been the subject of litigation by physicians
and patients who have challenged the federal government's authority to enact pro-
hibitions on marijuana use, particularly in medical circumstances. 2 1 In Kuromiya
v. United States, patients unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the-
Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on marijuana use for medical purposes. 22
The United States District Court held that the interstate nature of drug trade gives
15. Catheryn L. Blaine, Note, Supreme Court "Just Says No" to Medical Marijuana: A Look
at United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2002).
16. Id. The Marihuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937), was repealed by the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Alex Kreit, The Future of
Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1793 n.40
(2003).
17. Kreit, supra note 16, at 1793. While the Marihuana Tax Act effectively eliminated recre-
ational use of marijuana by charging a fine in excess of the cost of the drug itself, it did not
strictly prohibit its use. Id. Although the fine imposed for medical use of marijuana was sub-
stantially lower, the paperwork required of doctors who wanted to use medical marijuana in
their practice, decreased its use in the medical profession substantially. Id. (citing LESTER
GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (rev. & expanded ed.,
1997)).
18. Blaine, supra note 15, at 1196-97. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
20. Blaine, supra note 15, at 1209 (citing United States Drug Enforcement Administration,
Exposing the Myth of Medical Marijuana, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ongoing/marijuana.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2003)).
21. See, e.g., Kuromiya v. United States, 37 F Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999); People v.
Moore, 637 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1996).
22. 37 F. Supp. 2d 717,730 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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Congress the authority to regulate drugs under the Commerce Clause, and on that
basis, the Controlled Substances Act withstood constitutional challenge.
23
Enforcement of federal drug policy falls overwhelmingly to state and local
law enforcement agencies. In 1999, the Bureau of Justice's Statistics Law En-
forcement Management and Administrative Statistics indicated that 76 percent of
state law enforcement agencies had primary responsibility for enforcing drug laws
in their jurisdictions. 24 Furthermore, "90% of county police departments, 99% of
municipal police departments, and 95% of sheriffs' departments had primary re-
sponsibility for drug law enforcement."'25 Also, the arrest and seizure rates for
marijuana are staggering. In 2001, the federal government's total drug seizure for
the year amounted to 2,913,724 pounds, 2,673,535 pounds of which were attribut-
able to marijuana seizure. 26 The next most-seized drug was cocaine, which
amounted to only 235,377 pounds.
27
B. California Policies
Despite the federal government's policies against the use and distribution of
marijuana, some states have enacted legislation that decriminalizes the use of mari-
juana in certain medical instances. 28 Proponents of these laws urge that marijuana
can be used to alleviate symptoms that stem from a host of diseases, including
23. Id. The court also found that even in a case where a person who used medical marijuana
could prove that his marijuana had never crossed state lines, the court would not second-guess
the judgment of the legislature. Id. at 724. In enacting the Controlled Substances Act, Congress
made the following findings in asserting its authority to regulate drugs under the Commerce
Clause:
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate
and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the
interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession,
nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because-
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate com-
merce, (B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in
interstate commerce immediately before their distribution, and (C) controlled sub-
stances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to
such possession.
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling
the interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differen-
tiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate.
21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (1999). Similar to the above congressional findings, courts have likewise
recognized the authority of the federal government to regulate drugs under the Commerce Clause,
due to the interstate nature of the illegal drug market. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d
105, 106-07 (3rd Cir. 1996).
24. Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy: Drug Data
Summary (March 2003), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pdf/
drug-datasum.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
25. Id. at 2-3.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Nine states currently maintain laws that legalize marijuana for people with physician
recommendations or prescriptions. Associated Press, Supreme Court Clears Way for Medical
Marijuana, USA TODAY, October 14, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2003-10-14-mar-medicalx.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). These states include
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. Id.
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"AIDS, cancer, glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, paraplegia, epilepsy, and quadriple-
gia.' ' 29 In fact, ten states currently allow marijuana use in severely ill patients with
physician approval, though none of these states have extended this right for recre-
ational use.30
In California, the Compassionate Use Act of 199631 became the first voter-
approved initiative, granting patients that suffer from certain illnesses the right to
obtain marijuana for medical use upon the recommendation of a physician. 32 The
Compassionate Use Act provides, in pertinent part:
To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use mari-
juana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has
been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health
would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia,
AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness
for which marijuana provides relief... patients and their primary caregivers who
obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a
physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction. 33
The California initiative was enacted as a protective measure, ensuring that
seriously ill patients and their treating physicians would not be subject to state
criminal prosecution.34 In practice, the Act does not create a "complete" immu-
nity from arrest or prosecution, but rather, creates a statutory defense, both at trial
and in a motion, to set aside an indictment. 35 Although the California law has
powerful application for proponents of marijuana use for medical purposes in the
context of state action, the Act does not purport to make prohibited conduct under
federal law subject to a medical-use defense.36
In fact, upon passage of the California initiative, several groups organized to
distribute and manufacture marijuana for qualified patients, and were enjoined
from these activities under federal law.37 In United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Cooperative,38 the United States Supreme Court held that whether or not
legal under California state law, the manufacture and distribution of marijuana
remained illegal under federal law.39 On that basis, the Supreme Court reversed
29. Blaine, supra note 15, at 1212. See also The National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws, Medical Use, at http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3376 (last visited Jan.
30, 2004); Jerome P. Kassirer, Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 366,
366 (1997). For an in-depth report on medical research supporting the use of marijuana for the
reduction of cancerous tumors, see Manuel Guzman, Cannabinoids: Potential Anticancer Agents,
3 NATuRE REviEw 745, 745-55 (2003).
30. The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Summary of Active State
Programs, available at http://normil.orglindex.cfm?Group=ID-3376 (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).
32. Blaine, supra note 15, at 1215.
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).
34. People v. Bianco, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
35. People v. Mower, 49 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Cal. 2002).
36. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F Supp. 2d 1086, 1101-02, 1105 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
37. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486-87 (2001). See also
United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
38. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
39. Id. at 489. The Court recognized that the Controlled Substances Act itself specifically
provides that "marijuana has 'no currently accepted medical use' at all." Id. at 491 (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 812(b) (2000)).
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the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had recognized a medical
necessity defense to the federal Controlled Substances Act.40 Instead, the Court
found that the language of the Controlled Substances Act was clear in placing
marijuana on Schedule 1, a category that contains only those drugs that have "'high
potential for abuse,"' and "'lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical
supervision.-' 4 1 On that basis, the Supreme Court refused to apply the medical
necessity defense advocated by the California initiative to actions arising under
the federal law. 42
C. The Federal Government Responds to California's Policy
On December 30, 1996, Barry McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, released a statement entitled "The Administration's Response
to the Passage of California Proposition 215 and Arizona Proposition 200," in
which he declared the recommendation or prescription of marijuana by physicians
was inconsistent with "public interest" as used in the Controlled Substances Act,
and therefore, was grounds for revocation of a physician's federal license to pre-
scribe controlled substances. 43 This policy, recorded as a Notice in the Federal
Register, provided that a letter would be sent by the Departments of Justice and
Health and Human Services to practitioner associations and licensing boards, warn-
ing doctors that physicians who "intentionally provide their patients with oral or
written statements in order to enable them to obtain controlled substances in viola-
tion of federal law... risk revocation of their DEA prescription authority." 44
The policy itself, promulgated by a federal agency through the statement of its
director, seeks to stop physician recommendations of a controlled substance deemed
illegal by the federal government. 4 5 The policy set forth enforcement mechanisms
by federal agencies and ultimately ordered the revocation of federal prescription
licenses.4 6 Although the government's clear legislative intent was to nullify the
state initiatives in California and Arizona, this federal policy failed to otherwise
implicate state law.
In Pearson v. McCaffrey,47 a group of physicians sued the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Depart-
ment of Justice, and the Drug Enforcement Agency in federal district court, alleg-
ing that the federal policy prohibiting the recommendation of marijuana use in
medical circumstances was unconstitutional. 4 8 The plaintiff physicians sought to
enjoin the federal government from initiating civil, criminal, or administrative pro-
40. Id. at 488. Although the majority broadly construed its holding, negating the possibility
of a medical necessity defense to any regulation under the Controlled Substances Act, Justice
Stevens, in his concurrence, argued that this ruling should be limited to the distribution and
manufacture of marijuana, and that the medical necessity defense should be reviewed separately
in the case of a patient's prosecution for use of marijuana. Id. at 503 (Stevens, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 492 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C)).
42. Id. at 494.
43. Administrative Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62
Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 139 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
48. Id.
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ceedings against physicians who recommend and prescribe marijuana to their ter-
minally ill patients, or against patients who seek to obtain marijuana for medical
purposes, or scientists who seek to consult with patients and physicians through
research on medical marijuana. 49 The plaintiff physicians alleged that the federal
policy violated the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, as well as the Commerce
Clause and the Administrative Procedures Act, and that the policy exceeded the
statutory authority of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.50 The plaintiff
physicians failed on all counts to convince the district court that the federal policy
should be invalidated.5 1 Instead, the district court provided a full analysis of the
statement released by McCaffrey finding it to be, "in essence, a public affirmation
of the federal government's intent to enforce the CSA," rather than a new drug
policy.52
Addressing the First Amendment rights of physicians as they relate to the
recommendation of marijuana in certain medical circumstances, the court in Pearson
rejected all three of the plaintiffs' arguments that the federal policy amounted to a
prior restraint, that the policy was impermissibly content-based, and that the policy
was overbroad. 53 The court addressed the character of the "recommendations"
and "prescriptions" implicated by the policy and found that they did not amount to
protected speech. 54 In making this determination, the court noted that:
[I]n... California, the term 'recommend' has a special significance under the
law because patients are able to take a recommendation for medicinal marijuana
to a buyers' club to receive the drug. In these situations, a recommendation is
analogous to a prescription, therefore the federal government will treat it as such.
... It is clear that, short of a prescription or recommendation for marijuana, the
federal government will not get involved in communication between doctors,
patients, and researchers regarding the potential medical benefits of marijuana
use.
55
Because the federal policy did not restrict physicians from all communica-
tions with patients regarding the "benefits and risks of the use of marijuana," the
court found that the policy did not implicate First Amendment rights.56
III. THE CONANT DECISION
In Conant v. Walters, patients and physicians brought a class action suit to
enjoin the federal government from enforcing its policy against the recommenda-
tion of marijuana use to treat patients with severe medical conditions. 57 The United
States District Court entered a preliminary injunction against the government, pro-
viding that "the government 'may not take administrative action against physi-
cians for recommending marijuana unless the government in good faith believes
that it has substantial evidence' that the physician aided and abetted" marijuana
49. Id. at 115.
50. Id. at 117.
51. Id. at 125.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 119-20.
54. Id. at 120-21.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Conant v. Waiters, 309 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2002).
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purchase, cultivation or possession. 58 The government did not appeal the prelimi-
nary injunction, which remained in force for more than two years pending litiga-
tion. 59 In 1999, the district court entered a permanent injunction, enjoining the
federal government from enforcing its policy against physician recommendations
of medical marijuana. 60 The district court recognized the possibility of many le-
gitimate responses to a recommendation by a physician for the use of marijuana. 6 1
For example, the court concluded that patients could seek placement in a federally
approved, experimental marijuana-therapy program or could seek to repeal the
federal law against the use of marijuana in medical circumstances. 62 Finding that
the government's policy would unduly restrict discourse regarding public policy,
and that it would "disable patients from understanding their own situations well
enough to participate in the debate," the district court invalidated the federal policy
on First Amendment grounds. 63
On appeal, the court found that the fundamental issue in this case was the
extent to which the federal government may regulate communications in the doc-
tor-patient relationship without violating First Amendment rights. 64 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had reversed its recent decision in United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative65 concerning the exemption of
federal drug laws from dispensing marijuana in cases of medical necessity.6 6 The
court insisted that the present case involved issues independent from the applica-
tion of federal drug laws in the context of medical use; according to the court, the
issues presented by this case involved speech rights present in physician-patient
communications. 67
Although the government argued that the "recommendation" given by a phy-
sician is analogous to a prescription for marijuana because patients in California
may use a recommendation to obtain marijuana, albeit illegally under federal law,
the court refused to characterize "recommendation" in such a way.6 8 Instead, the
court stated that recommendations used by patients to illegally obtain marijuana
would subject physicians to charges of aiding and abetting the violation of federal
law.69 The Ninth Circuit, however, recognized that a recommendation by a doctor
for a patient to use medical marijuana constituted protected speech, unless the
doctor's intent is to actively help the patient obtain marijuana. 70
According to the Ninth Circuit, the injunction issued in this case restricts the
federal government from initiating an investigation of a physician solely on the
58. Id. at 633 (quoting Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
59. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d at 633.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 634.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 634-35 (quoting the district court's decision in Conant v. McCaffrey, No. 6 97-
00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000)).
64. Id. at 634.
65. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
66. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d at 634 (citing United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001), rev'g United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d
1109 (9th Cir. 1999)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 635.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 636.
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basis of a recommendation of marijuana; in other words, unless the government
has a good faith belief that it has substantial evidence of criminal conduct, it may
not investigate a physician simply for recommending marijuana use.7 1 The Ninth
Circuit was not clear, however, in defining the criminal conduct that the federal
government may rely upon, leaving a legitimate question as to whether the gov-
ernment may use criminal conduct on the part of the patient as a substantial basis
for initiating investigations with respect to a treating physician. 7 2
Applying principles set forth in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey73 and Rust v. Sullivan,74 the Ninth Circuit recognized that First
Amendment protection exists in the physician-patient relationship. 75 In fact, the
court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that "professional speech may
be entitled to 'the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer."' 76 In this
case, the court held that the protections provided to physicians in the doctor-pa-
tient relationship were compromised by the government's effort to "'prevent the
physician from exercising his or her medical judgment." 77 This purpose, accord-
ing to the court, resulted in an impermissible restriction on doctor-patient commu-
nication. 78
The Ninth Circuit also noted the effect of the government policy on physician-
patient relationships in California. 79 Although the government contended that the
federal policy was enacted to prohibit physician recommendations and prescrip-
tions that would result in illegal conduct by the patient, the court recognized that
the policy itself had "chilled" virtually all physician communication regarding
marijuana as a potential treatment for certain illnesses. 80 In fact, the court recog-
nized that the government had "even stipulated in the district court that a 'reason-
able physician would have a genuine fear of losing his or her DEA registration to
dispense controlled substances if that physician were to recommend marijuana to
his or her patients. '81 Finding that the government's policy had become, in prac-
tice, a broad threat to virtually all speech regarding the medical use of marijuana,
the Ninth Circuit found the policy unconstitutional under the First Amendment,
and on that basis, upheld the permanent injunction issued by the district court. 82
The concurring opinion argued that, although the majority correctly enjoined
the federal government from carrying out its policy on First Amendment grounds,
the federal policy also ran afoul of the Commandeering Doctrine set forth by New
York v. United States83 and Printz v. United States.84 Based on the Commandeer-
ing Doctrine, the concurring opinion argued that because federal drug laws rely
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
74. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
75. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d at 636.
76. Id. at 637 (quoting Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995)).
77. Id. at 638 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883-84).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 638-639.
81. Id. at 639.
82. Id.
83. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
84. 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d at 645 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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heavily on local law enforcement, particularly in circumstances involving posses-
sion of small amounts, as is generally the case for patients using marijuana for
medical purposes, the policy against doctor recommendations was largely a fed-
eral effort to force the State of California to change its law on the medical use of
marijuana. 85 Recognizing that the federal government retained the ability to keep
medical marijuana illegal, the concurring opinion argued that the federal govern-
ment could not force the State of California to do the same. 8 6 While the federal
government did not specifically order that California keep medical marijuana ille-
gal, the concurring opinion argued that, in effect, the federal government's policy
forces the State of California to do just that: "the state is being forced to regulate
conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated. ' ' 87 Recognizing that the doctor-pa-
tient relationship is regulated according to the states' traditional police powers, the
concurring opinion argued that the federal government had no authority to force
the states to regulate the doctor-patient relationship in the interest of a federal
policy.88
IV. RECOMMFiNDATIONS
The Ninth Circuit appropriately recognized that the Office of National Drug
Control Policy had publicly responded to the California initiative through a state-
ment by its director warning that physicians engaged in the recommendation or
prescription of marijuana would be subject to investigation, and ultimately, revo-
cation of their federally-issued licenses to prescribe controlled substances. 89 The
Ninth Circuit, however, failed to address the legal effect of the statement, includ-
ing its publication as a Notice, and ultimately complicated the issue presented by
the case. The statement itself, according to the government in Pearson v. McCaffrey,
was meant to iterate how the ONDCP, along with Health and Human Services and
the Drug Enforcement Agency, interpreted physician conduct in the context of the
Controlled Substances Act.90 According to the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals in Pearson v. McCaffrey, the statement issued in response to the California
initiative did not rise to the level of a new policy, but rather constituted an affirma-
tion of the government's intent to enforce the Controlled Substances Act.9 1
In Conant, rather than addressing the role of McCaffrey's statement as a No-
tice under federal law, the Ninth Circuit referred to the statement as a new and
distinct policy, enacted in direct response to state initiatives surrounding medical
marijuana, placing new restrictions on the medical profession. The court failed to
provide a detailed analysis of this conclusion. Although lacking in a full analysis,
the Ninth Circuit may have been correct to view McCaffrey's statement as a new
federal policy for two reasons: first, rather than restating the current law under the
Controlled Substances Act, McCaffrey's statement set clear regulations on physi-
85. Conant v. Waiters, 309 F.3d at 644-46 & n. 10 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 645-46.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 647.
89. Id. at 632 & n.1.
90. 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125 (D.D.C. 2001). See also supra notes 45-54 and accompanying
test.
91. Id.
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cians by prohibiting them from recommending marijuana. Second, rather than re-
affirming the legal consequences of failing to comply with the Controlled Sub-
stances Act, McCaffrey's statement outlined new enforcement mechanisms and
threatened specific punishment through the revocation of physicians' federal pre-
scriptive licenses. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit, had it analyzed the actual
notice more fully, might have explicitly disagreed with the court in Pearson v.
McCaffrey, determining that the policy was enacted as a new regulation on mari-
juana use and its relation to the medical profession.
Further proof that this policy has added a new dimension to the federal
government's drug regulation is evidenced by the fact that the policy itself has
"chilled speech" regarding marijuana use in doctor-patient relationships. 92 In ad-
dition, although the federal policy has been enjoined since 1997, nine doctors cur-
rently face revocation of their state medical licenses by the Medical Board of Cali-
fornia upon complaints by law enforcement agencies. 93 These physicians, includ-
ing a Berkeley-based psychiatrist, Dr. Tod Mikuriya, have been accused of "ex-
treme departure from the standard of care" through their written recommenda-
tions, granting patients medical approval for the use of marijuana, legal under Cali-
fornia law.94 The threatened revocation of state medical licenses confirms that the
policy itself has implications on the state level and is not a simple matter of federal
regulation.
On the other hand, because McCaffrey's statement purported to explain the
role of physician recommendations in the determination of "public interest" under
the Controlled Substances Act, a valid argument can be made that the statement
simply addressed the ways in which the government intended to enforce the Con-
trolled Substances Act itself. Further support for this conclusion exists in the fact
that McCaffrey's statement never underwent any federal legislative process to be-
come law, but was issued only as a Notice, with no indication it would ever be
formally codified. The Ninth Circuit in Conant never addressed these arguments,
but rather assumed that the policy was a distinct, new regulation on physician
speech.
Regardless of this distinction, the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to analyze the
context of the statement issued by the ONDCP. The federal government ought to
be able to threaten that which it may lawfully carry out. In other words, if the
ONDCP can revoke a physician's federal prescriptive license, or can declare the
basis upon which a federal prescriptive license may be revoked, it may lawfully
threaten to do so. In this case, the Ninth Circuit never addressed when or why a
federal prescriptive license may lawfully be revoked. For this reason, the Ninth
Circuit complicated the issue and arguably stretched the First Amendment beyond
its scope.
Although the majority recognized the government's argument that doctor "rec-
ommendations" under the federal policy were analogous to "prescriptions," the
court rejected this contention without analyzing the context within which the argu-
ment was made. 95 In California, as recognized in Pearson v. McCaffrey, the "rec-
92. Conant v. Waiters, 309 F3d at 638.
93. Ann Harrison, Prosecuting the Pot Doc, THE SAN FRANcIsco BAY GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2003,
available at http.www.sfbg-com/38/02/news-mikuriya.html.
94. Id.
95. Conant v. Walters, 309 F3d at 635.
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ommendation" of marijuana as a medical treatment by a medical professional gen-
erally consists of a piece of writing by the doctor, which historically acted as a
prescription, and currently acts as a permit of sorts to possess marijuana under
state law.96 Based on the fact that the federal policy grouped "recommendations"
and "prescriptions" together for the purpose of regulation, but never purported to
restrict physicians from "communicating" or "informing" their patients about the
use of marijuana to treat certain illnesses, the government makes a compelling
argument that the federal policy does not implicate speech at all 97 Rather, the
federal policy regulates conduct; specifically, the prescription for or "recommen-
dation" (as used in the limited sense of this context) of marijuana in severely ill
patients.
Failing to recognize the complexities of the federal policy, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the First Amendment rights implicated by substantially restricting physi-
cian approval of marijuana use in certain medical circumstances. The court ana-
lyzed whether a physician's recommendation of medical marijuana constituted
protected speech if the doctor's intent was not to help the patient obtain marijuana
for that purpose.9 8 Although the record of medical marijuana policy in California
clearly establishes that medical recommendations are made specifically for that
purpose, 99 even in the absence of such a finding, physician recommendations of
medical marijuana do not fall within a category of protected speech recognized by
the Supreme Court. Rather, such speech has been explicitly recognized as subject
to the regulatory powers of the state. 100
Recognizing that speech and conduct are often invariably intertwined, the
Supreme Court has stated that when "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are com-
bined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important government interest
in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." 101 Adopting a test for government regulations on con-
duct that create certain incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms, the
Supreme Court stated:
96. Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2001). See United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coup., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (providing evidence that physician "recommen-
dations" were used, prior to the decision of the Supreme Court, as a means of obtaining mari-
juana from providers set up for medical purposes). See also Harrison, supra note 93 (referring
to the investigation of physicians who had "written more than half the estimated 50,000 medical
marijuana recommendations in California").
97. See Administrative Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215,
62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
98. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d at 636.
99. See Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2001); United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
100. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing that the regulation of physi-
cian conduct is the prerogative of the states and outside the reach of the federal government).
See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,591 (1977); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 881 (1992); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376-77 (2002).
101. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). In United States v. O'Brien, the
Supreme Court upheld a government restriction on the burning of Selective Service registration
certificates, despite First Amendment protection of expressive conduct, on the basis that the
government had an important interest in regulating the destruction of the certificates. Id. at 367.
102. Id. at 377.
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[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.102
In order to determine the communicative nature of particular conduct warranting
First Amendment protection, the United States Supreme Court has asked whether
"[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surround-
ing circumstances, the likelihood was great that the message would be understood
by those who viewed it."
' 10 3
Although government- and state-imposed restrictions on speech carry a heavy
presumption against their validity, the Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment does not protect all actions in all places. 10 4 In fact, limitations on the
manner, time and placeof expression are generally upheld if the restrictions serve
a significant government interest1 0 5 and if the restrictions themselves do not alter
the message, ideas, or content of expression. 10 6 Recognizing that the basic guar-
antee provided by the First Amendment is the guarantee that all ideas may be ad-
vocated without government intrusion, the Supreme Court has strictly ruled against
content-based restrictions on speech. 107 When the government does create a speech
restriction, the Supreme Court has held that it may not regulate "based on hostil-
ity-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed." 108
While content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid, there
do remain some areas of expression that the government may regulate. 109 In addi-
tion to obscene and libelous speech, the Supreme Court has historically left speech
103. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
104. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (stating that the government is entitled
to enforce reasonable regulations on the time, place and manner of expression, as long as such
restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication"). Id. (citation omitted). See
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119-20 (1972) (finding restrictions as to the time
and place of demonstrations on school property a reasonable limitation on First Amendment
protections); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,46-48 (1966) (affirming trespass convictions of
protestors on jailhouse grounds, viewing jailhouse property as an unreasonable place for such
protests).
105. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
106. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). In Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, the Court found
that government-imposed restrictions on the subject-matter of political expression were imper-
missible under the First Amendment to the Constitution.
107. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959) (hold-
ing that a state may not deny a license to a film based on the message portrayed in the film);
RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (finding a city ordinance unconstitutional be-
cause it prohibited racially offensive speech, solely based on the offensive content of the speech).
108. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 386.
109. See, e.g., Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment),
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unprotected that incites illegal action. 110 In Brandenburg v. Ohio,111 the Supreme
Court set forth the modem test for incitement speech left unprotected by the First
Amendment. In that case, the Court recognized that the government did not enjoy
the right to regulate speech that merely advocates lawlessness. 112 According to
the Court, the government may, however, proscribe speech that is "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."1 13 This two-part test has typically become the measure for govern-
ment action taken against protesters, and has been applied narrowly, allowing gov-
ernment to regulate speech only in instances where lawless action or violence is
imminent. 114
The Court has been careful to note that participation in critical political dis-
course, even by advocating violent or lawless means, is protected by the First
Amendment and does not fall within incitement language, as defined by
Brandenburg v. Ohio.115 Although the test identified in Brandenburg is for speech
that urges or incites immediate lawless action, the scope of the incitement cases
may well be more limited. The historical recognition of incitement language be-
gan with sedition and early cases involving conspiracies to obstruct the United
States during wartime. 116 In the early incitement cases, the Court required the
expression to "create a clear and present danger that.., will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent" in order to qualify as incitement
unprotected by the First Amendment. 117 Even in modern incitement cases, the
Court has required much more than mere advocacy of an illegal purpose. 118 In-
stead, the incitement doctrine has been narrowly applied to circumstances that
urge immediate, violent, lawless actions. 119 In the context of medical marijuana,
it is doubtful that physician recommendations, though they arguably incite lawless
action, would be reached by the scope of the incitement cases.
The First Amendment to the Constitution applies not only to personal commu-
nications, but is also recognized in the realms of commercial and professional
speech, though on a more limited basis. 120 The Supreme Court has recognized
110. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919); Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
111. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
112. Id. at 447.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (holding that language that advo-
cates lawless action at some "indefinite future time" is not considered incitement language, and
is protected by the First Amendment).
115. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447.
116. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919).
117. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52.
118. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). "The essential distinction is that those to
whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather
than merely to believe in something." Id. at 324-25.
119. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See generally Kent Greenawalt,
Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 645.
120. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976).
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that government may regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity
or that is misleading. 121
The Supreme Court recently addressed a Ninth Circuit decision which held
that specific provisions of the Food and Drug Administration's Modernization Act
amounted to impermissible restrictions on commercial speech. 122 In Thompson v.
Western States Medical Center, the Court addressed a provision of the Moderniza-
tion Act that prohibited the solicitation or advertisement of particular compounded
drugs by pharmaceutical providers. 123 The Court analyzed the commercial speech
according to a two-part test, articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York. 124 According to this test, the Court first
asked "a threshold matter of whether the commercial speech concerns unlawful
activity or is misleading." 125 If unlawful or misleading, the Court determined that
the First Amendment does not protect the commercial speech. 126 If the speech at
issue does not concern unlawful activity or misleading information, the Court then
addresses the substantial nature of the government's interest in regulating the
speech. 12 7 Applying this test, the Court held that the government regulation re-
garding the advertisement and solicitation of compounded drugs was an unconsti-
tutional restriction on commercial speech because the government had failed to
show how the restrictions would advance its interests or that less restrictive alter-
natives were unavailable. 128
Although commercial speech such as advertising may be afforded constitu-
tional protection according to the tests set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York129 and Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center, 130 the speech interests of medical professionals in the treat-
ment of patients has been analyzed by courts in a different way. 131 In Rust v.
Sullivan,13 2 the Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to regula-
tions promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services that limited
121. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of NY, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980). The Court has further recognized the application of the test set forth in Central Hudson
in the areas of particular professions, including law (see Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618 (1995), and the medical profession (see Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357
(2002)).
122. Thompson v. United States, 535 U.S. at 360.
123. Id. Drug compounding is the process by which a medical professional (pharmacist or
doctor, generally) mixes, combines or alters the ingredients in a medication in order to tailor it to
a specific patient's needs. Id. at 360-61. Although these individually compounded drugs are not
submitted for approval by the FDA, their regulation has historically been left to the states. Id. at
362. For more information on drug compounding and modem issues in pharmaceutical regula-
tion, see J. THOMPSON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY PHARMACY PRACTICE, 11.3 (1998).
124. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 367 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
125. Id. at 367.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 376.
129. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
130. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
131. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysts v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000).
132. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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the ability of Title X 133 fund recipients to use federal funding for abortion-related
activities. 134 The Act at issue in Rust v. Sullivan provided that "[nione of the funds
appropriated.., shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning." 135 The Supreme Court held that the regulations, on their face, would
not be deemed unconstitutional if a conceivable constitutional construction was
possible for the Act. 136 On that basis, the Court ruled that the Act was constitu-
tional. 137 With respect to the First Amendment challenge, the Court refused to
recognize an infringement on speech where funding was provided to certain orga-
nizations that further "certain permissible goals" (childbirth) while discouraging
"alternative goals" (abortion). 138 Because physicians in this case were not singled
out based on the content of their speech, but rather, were denied funding for activi-
ties, including speech, reaching beyond the goals of a funded project, the Court
held that speech rights were not implicated. 139 Although the Court recognized the
First Amendment rights present in the doctor-patient relationship, it refused to
analyze the full scope of doctor-patient rights because nothing in the Act at issue
"requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact
hold." 140
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit examined the nature of First Amendment rights of
psychoanalysts, who argued that their free speech rights had been abridged by the
State of California's licensing requirements. 14 1 According to the Ninth Circuit,
"'the key component of psychoanalysis is the treatment of emotional suffering and
depression, not speech.... That psychoanalysts employ speech to treat their cli-
ents does not entitle them, or their profession, to special First Amendment protec-
tion.' 142 The court further noted that "[t]he communication that occurs during
psychoanalysis is entitled to constitutional protection, but it is not immune from
regulation."' 14 3 The court found that the state's interest in its requirements, en-
acted for the purpose of regulating the quality of mental health services in the
state, was compelling, and that the regulations themselves did not suppress speech
based on its message. 144 On that basis, the court held that psychoanalysts' First
Amendment rights were not impermissibly restricted by the California licensing
requirements. 145
133. The Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 - 300a-6 (2000), provides federal
funding to public and nonprofit private entities that provide voluntary family planning projects
and services.
134. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 177-78.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6.
136. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 183, 190. The Court relied upon Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); NLRB v. Catho-
lic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490,500 (1979) ("an Act of Congress ought not be construed to
violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available.").
137. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 178.
138. Id. at 194.
139. Id. at 194-95.
140. Id. at 200.
141. Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysts v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d
1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000).
142. Id. at 1054.
143. Id. (citing IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 1054-55.
145. Id. at 1056.
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In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,146 the Su-
preme Court specifically addressed the speech rights of physicians in the context
of regulations placed on physicians by a state statute, requiring doctors to provide
specific information to patients considering an abortion. 14 7 The information, pub-
lished by the State, included, among other things, information about "medical as-
sistance for childbirth . .. child support from the father, and a list of agencies
which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion." 14 8 The
Court rejected petitioners' argument that a physician's First Amendment right not
to speak 149 necessitated the state regulation's invalidation on constitutional
grounds. 150 Instead, the Court stated, "the physician's First Amendment rights not
to speak are implicated... but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infir-
mity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by
the State here." 15 1 Because the state-required information was justified by an
interest in ensuring that "a woman be apprised of the health risks of abortion and
childbirth," the Court ruled that the information was within the realm of medical
information that the state police power has the power to regulate. 152 The Court,
recognizing the speech interests of physicians, refused to allow those interests to
override state-based regulation of professional conduct. 153
In Casey, the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment applies in
limited circumstances within the doctor-patient relationship, but that the state's
interests in regulating physician conduct may substantially outweigh these indi-
vidual speech interests. 154 The authority to regulate professional conduct, par-
ticularly that of medical professionals, is derived from the state's general police
powers and not from any federal authority. 155 For example, in Linder v. United
States,156 the Supreme Court held that a physician, who, in good faith, dispensed
small amounts of narcotics to a drug addict, did not violate federal narcotics laws. 157
Although Linder has not been reversed, it predates the Controlled Substances Act,
and therefore, does not address detoxification of drug addicts according to modem
drug laws. The case does, however, provide the general principle that "direct con-
trol of medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal Govern-
ment." 1
58
In Whalen v. Roe, 159 physicians and patients challenged the constitutionality
of a New York statute requiring the registration of names and addresses of all
146. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
147. Id. at 881.
148. Id.
149. See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (upholding an individual's right
not to convey a State message).
150. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
151. Id. (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 884-85.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601-03 (1977). See also Linder v. United States, 268
U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
156. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
157. Id. at 22-23.
158. Id. at 18.
159. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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patients who had obtained, by physician prescription, drugs identified by the New
York Controlled Substances Act as having both permissible medical and illegal
recreational uses. 160 Although the plaintiffs argued that the physician-patient re-
lationship involved a "zone of privacy" protected by the due process clause, 16 1 the
Court held that "the State's vital interest in controlling the distribution of danger-
ous drugs would support a decision to experiment with new techniques for con-
trol." 162 For this purpose, the Court determined that states' broad police powers
could be used to regulate the professional conduct of physicians. 163
In a detailed analysis of free speech rights and the regulation of the medical
profession, it seems that the State of California could have properly enacted regu-
lations limiting the ability of physicians to speak to their patients about medical
treatment with marijuana, particularly if California had deemed the regulation nec-
essary for the safety of patients. In this context, the physician's First Amendment
rights might be implicated, "but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation of the State." 164 As in Casey, no constitu-
tional infirmity would exist in requiring that physicians provide (or not provide)
information mandated by state professional conduct policies, as long as the poli-
cies reflect a substantial government interest. 165
Similar to the situation in National Ass'n for the Advancement of Psycho-
analysis v. California Board of Psychology, physicians may use speech to treat
their clients, or to communicate the treatment that they recommend; however, "It]he
communication that occurs during [this treatment, although] entitled to constitu-
tional protection, .... is not immune from regulation." 166 Rather, states retain the
prerogative to control professional conduct in the realm of the medical profes-
sion. 167
While the states retain the power to regulate the professional conduct of phy-
sicians, even when speech may be used to carry the conduct out, "direct control of
medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the federal government." 168
Although never addressed by the majority, the ultimate reason the federal govern-
ment might have been enjoined from its stated policy lies in the inability of the
federal government to enact regulations regarding the professional conduct of phy-
sicians. The concurring opinion appropriately recognized this failure.
According to the concurring opinion in Conant, however, the federal govern-
ment enacted its policy in an attempt to force the State of California to regulate
what it had chosen not to regulate. 169 According to the concurrence, because the
federal policy in effect rendered California's initiative invalid, and because the
federal government relies heavily on local law enforcement in drug arrests and
160. Id. at 591.
161. Id. at 598.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 600-03. See also Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing that
the regulation of physician conduct is the prerogative of the states and outside the reach of the
federal government).
164. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
165. Id.
166. 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000).
167. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. at 18.
168. Id.
169. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 645 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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prosecutions, the federal government has impermissibly commandeered the State
of California. In the present case, state law enforcement agencies have not been
called upon to enforce the federal policy; the policy itself calls for action by the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice, both
agencies of the federal government. 170 The concurring opinion fails to recognize
that federal preemption is not commandeering. In fact, courts have generally and
consistently upheld the federal government's authorization, under the Commerce
Clause, to regulate drug use, even in medical circumstances. If the federal govern-
ment had chosen to invalidate California's initiative, the Controlled Substances
Act, which recognizes no acceptable medical use for marijuana, preempts state
law to the contrary.
One remaining avenue that the Ninth Circuit could have addressed is the ques-
tion of how far congressional authority extends in the realm of medical marijuana.
While courts have generally upheld congressional prohibitions on medical mari-
juana, case law also generally denies the federal government the authority to regu-
late physician conduct. The court might have addressed the congressional find-
ings in 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 that authorized the regulation of controlled substances
under the Commerce Clause, but, in this new analysis weighed the weaker link to
interstate drug traffic in medical cases against the dangers of extending the Com-
merce Clause to the realm of physician conduct. Allowing the federal government
to strictly regulate the medical profession effectively blurs the line between na-
tional and local matters, relegating a long list of traditional police powers into the
federal realm.
Nevertheless, because the federal government retains the general authority to
grant and revoke the prescriptive licenses of physicians, the federal government
should be allowed to issue statements warning how these actions will be carried
out. Unless the federal policy at issue in this case overreaches the federal
government's role by regulating physician conduct in a way unheard of with re-
spect to the government's licensing authority, the Ninth Circuit should not have
affirmed the decision to enjoin the policy. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit
should have focused part of its analysis on these issues. Although the court appro-
priately recognized the chilling effect the federal policy had at the state level, these
effects should not have been the crux of the court's decision. Instead, if the Ninth
Circuit determined that the federal government's policy unduly restricted doctor-
patient communications and legitimate, lawful responses to such communications,
they should have affirmed the district court's injunction insofar as the policy was
overbroad, but reversed the part of the injunction that removed federal authority to
threaten lawful federal action.
V. CONCLUSION
This case is the logical end to vague and conflicting policies regarding the
medical use of marijuana. If federal law may regulate all marijuana use, state laws
contrary to federal law are preempted. To this end, the government could have
enacted a law that precluded states from legalizing marijuana use under any cir-
cumstances or providing protection to people who violate federal law. Instead, the
170. Id. at 632-33.
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government enacted a policy that limited physicians in their ability to make rec-
ommendations to patients, a decision that placed federal marijuana policy on shaky
ground and arguably extended the regulatory power of the federal government too
far. The Ninth Circuit, however, places itself on even shakier ground by attacking
the regulation of doctors on the basis of free speech, rather than going for the heart
of the issue, which is the ability of the federal government to regulate physician
conduct. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit misapplied the First Amendment to
its legal determination of the issues presented in Conant v. Walters.
Katharine McCarthy

